Reason, Luck, and Meaning
: A Critique of the Moralist View of Meaning in Life
Kazuki Watanabe
Journal of Philosophy of Life Vol.12, No.1 (November 2022):101-115
Abstract
Since the 20th century, many philosophy papers have been written about the concept of meaning in life. One notable question in the field is whether there is a necessary connection between morality and meaning. This paper’s objective is to tackle this question and bring out two points that favor the view that there is no necessary connection between morality and meaning. I attempt to support the anti-moralist view that morality is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for a meaningful life. To do so, I articulate and defend two arguments suggested by Bernard Williams: one argument from the perspective of categorical desire and another from the perspective of luck. The first contrasts morality’s impartiality with meaning as personal, and the second contrasts morality’s immunity to luck with meaning’s vulnerability to luck.
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