[Discussion Paper]
Phenomenological Skillful Coping
: Another Counter-Argument to Daniel Dennett’s
Heterophenomenology
Jethro Masís
Journal of Philosophy of Life Vol.2, No.1 (March 2012):67-91
Abstract
This paper deals with Daniel Dennett’s well-known charges against phenomenological philosophy
as an endevour to restore the rights of introspection: that is, the attempt, albeit doomed to failure, to
contribute to the science of the mind from a purported incorrigible, ineffable and ‘subjective’
(interpreted as ‘private’) first-person perspective. According to Dennett’s heterophenomenology,
only a strict third-person method is possible when it comes to the scientific study of the mind. I will
dispute Dennett’s method in order to do both: correct Dennett’s caricaturization of
phenomenological philosophy as naïve introspection and offer not only a clarification of
phenomenology’s true aims and scope, but also a case in which phenomenology will stand as a
crucial option in the new studies of the mind, under the sigh of fresh air that can be found in the new
approaches to cognitive science (the so-called 4EA approaches: embodied, embedded, extended,
enacted, affective). By way of introducing the concept of ‘phenomenological skillful-coping,’ an
affirmative respond to Dennett’s own question shall be given: “Is there anything about experience
that is not explorable by heterophenomenology? I’d like to know what.” The answer to Dennett
should be firm: Yes there is! No less than the most basic non-theoretical, non-representational,
embodied and embedded, human experience or coping.
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